We combine the augmented Solow model with the Mincer equation to derive a specification that identifies an education externality within a production function framework. The previous empirical literature has not reached a consensus about the size of the education externality, which is given by the difference between the microeconomic and the macroeconomic return to education. Relative to our benchmark value that is based on a parameterization of the derived specification, we find that the estimated education externality is too large when the empirical model is not properly restricted, and appears to be absent when all control variables of the empirical model are properly accounted for. We note that the absence of an education externality is difficult to reconcile with observed levels of education subsidies for efficiency reasons.
INTRODUCTION
Educational capital appears to be one of the factors that are closely related to long-run economic development. For instance, a high level of education per worker may increase the productivity of other production factors like physical capital and co-workers, or a high aggregate level of educational capital may generate more ideas and hence faster technological change. Thus educational capital accumulation may have macroeconomic returns that go beyond the individual private returns. Presumed education externalities in turn appear to justify the prevailing public subsidization of education in most if not all countries of the world.
Positive education externalities should show up as the difference between the macroeconomic and the microeconomic return to education. Empirical work on this issue has not derived clear-cut conclusions up to now. Some authors find evidence in favor of aggregate education externalities, but others deny their empirical relevance, as summarized by Pritchett (2006) . We think that part of the inconclusive state of the art has to do with the occasional comparison of returns that is inconsistent with a simple production function framework, and with the neglect of important control variables such as the quality of schooling in relation to the quantity of schooling.
We use the framework of the augmented Solow model (Mankiw et al., 1992) to derive a specification that identifies an education externality within a production function framework. Our discussion aims to clarify how a macroeconomic return to education can be related to a Mincerian return (Mincer, 1974) , which has served in the literature as the standard benchmark for a microeconomic return to education. 1 We show how a number of restrictions can be imposed on the specification in order to gain degrees of freedom for the estimation. Benchmark calculations based on a parameterization of our derived specification then suggest a range of plausible estimates for the education externality.
Based on these considerations, we argue that it will become difficult to estimate the exact size of the education externality when the difference between the macroeconomic and the microeconomic return to education is predicted to be in a narrow range of about 3 percentage points. Our empirical results roughly confirm that the search for the size of the education externality comes close to the proverbial search for the needle in the haystack.
THE AUGMENTED SOLOW MODEL, MINCERIAN SCHOOLING AND EDUCATION EXTERNALITIES

From the Mincer equation to a further augmented Solow model
For more than 30 years, the Mincer equation (Mincer, 1974) has been the workhorse for estimating the effect of schooling on individual wage income. The Mincer equation postulates a linear relation between the (log) wage as the dependent variable and education in the form of years of formal schooling and working experience, as in a specification like
where ln(w i ) is the log wage of individual i, school i is individual years of schooling, and exper i is individual years of working experience. 2 The coefficient b 1 is the Mincerian private return to schooling. This coefficient indicates that an additional year of schooling raises the wage by b 1 per cent on average, all other things constant. Estimating the Mincer specification (1) with micro data, numerous studies for rich and poor countries suggest an average private return to schooling in the range of 6-10%, with the lower end as a representative estimate for an OECD average and the higher end as a representative estimate for a world average. 3 Microeconometric estimates mainly focus on measuring the effect of an additional year of schooling on individual wage income and thus do not account for potential macroeconomic education externalities. However, the microeconomic relation between individual years of schooling and wages can be translated into a relation between average years of schooling and per capita income. The reason is that the labor share (the share of total wages in GDP) does not follow a trend, neither over time ( Piketty and Saez, 2003) nor across countries (Bernanke and Gürkaynak, 2001; Gollin, 2002) . But if labor shares are constant, wages are proportional to per capita income. Hence, the private return to schooling has to be multiplied by the labor share to derive a benchmark for the macroeconomic return to schooling that would be expected in the absence of an education externality. Put differently, a positive difference between an observed macro return to schooling and the proportionally adjusted private return to schooling would indicate the presence (and size) of an education externality.
The production function framework of the augmented Solow model (Mankiw et al., 1992) provides a convenient possibility to clarify these considerations. For instance, one may start with a Cobb-Douglas production function with physical capital K and labor L as the two basic inputs and assume that labor input is conditioned for the average level of education, such that
where Y j is the aggregate output of country j, B j an index of the level of technology that is exogenous to individual firms within countries, K j the stock of aggregate physical capital, h j the average level of education, and L j the labor force. Educational capital accumulation may generate an externality, such that
where A j is an index of country-specific technology that grows over time t at an exogenous rate g with A j ¼ Að0Þ j e gt and g represents the education externality. 4 The Mincer equation (1) suggests that the average level of education may be specified as a function of average schooling years and average experience (Bils and Klenow, 2000) , such that
where m is a constant, school j is average years of schooling in country j and exper j is average years of working experience, and b 1 and b 2 represent the average individual private returns to schooling and experience. Substituting (4) and (3) into (2), it follows that
Taking logs, dividing by L j and rearranging terms gives
where y j is GDP per person in country j, and k j is capital per person in the labor force. Assuming that a constant fraction of output is saved and invested, and definingk j ¼ K=AL as the stock of capital per effective unit of labor and y j ¼ Y=AL as the level of output per effective unit of labor, it follows that the evolution ofk j over time is governed by
where s j 5 (I/GDP) j is the share of investment in GDP, n j is the growth rate of the labor force and d is the rate of depreciation of physical capital. Mankiw et al. (1992) show that equation (7) implies thatk j converges to a steadystate value k j , where dk j =dt ¼ 0:
Substituting the steady-state capital intensity k j for k j and taking logs, equation (6) can be rewritten as
where const ¼ ð1 À a þ gÞ ln m is a constant. 5 Equation (9) predicts that the coefficient on the investment share equals in absolute value the coefficient on labor force growth (conditioned by g and d). For a capital share in factor income of one-third, the size of this coefficient is predicted to be (1/3)/ (1 À (1/3)) 5 0.5. Furthermore, the coefficients of the two components of the average level of education, schooling years and experience, are predicted to be the same except for the difference in the two private rates of return, b 1 and b 2 . Since the private returns to schooling and experience are known from a large microeconometric literature, the education externality g remains as the only free parameter of equation (9).
Imposing on equation (9) the empirical restrictions on the capital share and on the two private returns, we can rearrange terms as
where the restricted parameters are indicated by a bar. In this specification, the coefficient to be estimated is ð1 À a þ gÞ. In the absence of an education externality, the coefficient should equal two-thirds for a capital share of one-third.
Macro returns and the size of the education externality: benchmark calculations
Equation (10) can be used to derive benchmark values for the macroeconomic returns to schooling (l school ) and experience (l exper ):
and
Hence, with a capital share in factor income of a ¼ 1=3 and with b 1 ¼ 0:1 as an upper bound for the private return to schooling, we would expect to find a value of the macro-Mincer return to schooling of l school 5 0.067 if there is no education externality. Similarly, we would expect to find a value of the macro return to experience of l exper 5 0.02 for an average private return of 3% ð b 2 ¼ 0:03Þ if there is no education externality. That is, a macro return to schooling of 10% or a macro return to experience of 3% would indicate the presence of a large education externality. Prevailing subsidies to public education are a possible reason for expecting empirical estimates of l school and l exper above the benchmark values of 6.7% and 2%. Given that the instructional costs of schooling are mainly covered by public expenditures in most countries, the question of interest is by how much the empirical estimates of l school and l exper can be expected to differ from the benchmark values. For instance, in the United States, about 90% of the instructional costs at public colleges are paid by federal and state governments. Based on US data, Heckman and Klenow (1997) calculate that due to these subsidies, an individual will be indifferent between additional schooling (college) and working if the private Mincerian return to schooling is about 9%, which is in line with the typical micro-Mincer estimates. From the point of view of the government, they calculate that the observed level of schooling subsidies is justified if the macroeconomic return to schooling is about 3 percentage points higher than the benchmark value for the private return. Hence, based on our no-externality macro benchmark value of 6.7%, we would expect to find a macro return to schooling of about 10% in order to justify present levels of schooling subsidies.
A similar benchmark follows from a calculation that considers the macroeconomic return to physical capital. If capital earns its marginal product (MPK), it can be measured as MPK ¼ a=ðK=YÞ. With a capital share of one-third and a capital-output ratio of 3, as discussed by Mankiw et al. (1992) for the United States, it follows that the implied macroeconomic return to physical capital equals 11%. With a lower capital-output ratio of 2, which represents an average value for rich and poor countries, the implied macroeconomic return to capital would rise to about 17%. For a lower bound of the capital share of a ¼ 1=4, the macroeconomic return to capital would range from 8% to 13%, conditional on the applied capital-output ratio. Since the macroeconomic returns to physical and educational capital investments will tend to be equalized, we consider a macro return to schooling of about 10% as a lower bound.
Given that the level of schooling subsidies reaches similar levels as in the United States in most countries around the world, an estimated macro return to schooling in the range of 10% would imply that a large education externality is already internalized by the public subsidization of schooling. For instance, equation (11a) suggests a benchmark value for the education externality g of one-third for a macro return of 10%, a micro return of 10% and a capital share of one-third. 6 Equation (11a) also suggests that an estimate of an education externality that differs in a statistically significant way from the benchmark estimate will 6. Lucas (1990) be hard to come by. This is because even small and statistically insignificant differences in macro returns to schooling imply large differences in the size of the education externality. For all other parameters as before, an estimate of the macro return of 15% would already imply an education externality of 0.8, which looks implausibly high within a production function framework. 7 Thus a priori it seems that empirical analyses can at best reveal whether there is a positive education externality at all, but not by how much such an externality may differ from a benchmark value of one-third that considers the prevailing level of education subsidies.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Main variables and measures of schooling quality
We begin our empirical analysis with a basic sample of 82 countries 8 for which we have data on the variables specified in equation (9), mainly for the base year 1995. Our data on GDP per worker (y), investment (s 5 I/GDP) and labor force growth (n) are taken from PWT 6.1 (Heston et al., 2002) . We assume a constant rate g 5 0.02 and a constant rate d 5 0.05, as is standard in the related literature (see e.g. Barro et al., 1995) . Average years of schooling (school) are taken from Barro and Lee (2001) and our measure of the average years of experience of the workforce (exper) is based on data taken from United Nations (1997). Appendix A.1 includes detailed information on the definitions and sources of all variables used in the empirical analysis. Our preferred measure of schooling years takes into account that the quality of schooling is not the same across countries. Recent comparative studies of international educational standards such as the PISA study (OECD, 2001) or previously the TIMS study (TIMSS International Study Center, 1996) have shown that there are large international differences in the quality of schooling. We address this problem by correcting the observed average years of schooling with a measure of schooling quality.
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) report standardized test scores in international comparisons of student achievement in 'per cent correct' format. For countries not covered by Hanushek and Kimko (2000) but included in our sample, we have imputed the missing values as averages of region-and income-based estimates, as reported in Gundlach et al. (2002) . We then transform the 'per cent correct' format into a format with an average of 500 and a standard deviation of 100 by solving for a and b in
7. An education externality of 0.8 would imply that a doubling of all inputs would increase output by a factor of 3.5. 8. See Appendix A.2. and stdðper cent correctÞ Â b ¼ 100 ð13Þ
The format with an average of 500 and a standard deviation of 100 has been established as a standard reporting format in recent international studies of student achievement (OECD, 2001; TIMSS International Study Center, 1996) . According to these studies, a test score difference of about 50 points represents an average performance difference of about one year of schooling (one grade). Regressing average years of schooling on our transformed test score measure, we find that one year of schooling in the population aged 15-65 is associated with a test score difference of about 60 points, close to the results reported for TIMSS and PISA. We define our measure of qualityadjusted schooling as
where test j is the transformed test score result for country j. That is, for countries with test score results close to the international average of 500 points (like the United States), the quality adjustment does not make an important difference, but a country with a test score result of about 380 points (like Kenya) would have a quality-adjusted measure of schooling that is about two years below the average years of schooling reported by Barro and Lee (2001) .
Empirical estimates of the education externality
Our empirical analysis mainly aims at estimating the sign of the presumed education externality, and more ambitiously at estimating its size. As discussed in Section 2, we impose as restrictions a capital share of a ¼ 1=3, and private returns to schooling of b 1 ¼ 0:1 and to experience of b 2 ¼ 0:03. By imposing the empirical restrictions we can circumvent the problem that otherwise the parameters of equation (9) cannot be estimated simultaneously because we have the four potentially unknown parameters a, g, b 1 and b 2 , but only the three explanatory variables (conditional) investment [ln s j À lnðn j þ g þ dÞ], average years of schooling with or without quality adjustment (qschool, school) and experience (exper). Hence, we estimate the education externality g with the restricted equation (10). However, equation (10) suggests that we should control for international differences in the level of technology A j .
In Appendix A.3 we document that a number of variables that have been suggested in the literature as proxies for differences in technology across countries are closely correlated with a set of continental dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Asia (ASIA) and Latin America (LATINAM). For instance, we find that this set of three continental dummies can explain between 40% and 70% of the variation of each of the following variables, which all may reflect certain aspects of international differences in a broad concept of technology: a measure of life expectancy (Heckman and Klenow, 1997) , two alternative measures of the prevalence of malaria (Sachs, 2003) and four alternative measures of institutional quality (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Hall and Jones, 1999; Rodrik et al., 2004) . These empirical results motivate our approach to control for international differences in a broad concept of technology with continental dummies.
We obtain three basic results. We obtain a statistically significant education externality with a large point estimate of 2.6 if we do not control for international differences in the quality of schooling and in investment and technology [ Table 1 , column (1)]. From an economic perspective, i.e. relative to our benchmark value of 0.33 derived in Section 2, an estimated externality of 2.6 appears to reflect an omitted variables bias, since measures of education and experience are likely to be positively correlated with the quality of schooling, the level of investment and the level of technology. Hence, the estimated externality is likely to be biased upwardly.
Once we control for differences in the quality of schooling [column (2)] or for differences in the levels of investment and technology [column (3)], the point estimates of the externality are substantially reduced and remain statistically significant, but they are still too high to be plausible within the production function framework outlined in Section 2.
Our preferred specification controls for differences in the quality of schooling and for differences in the levels of investment and technology [column (4)]. Here we find that the point estimate of the education externality drops to 0.11 and becomes statistically insignificant. Even the one-sided hypothesis of g 5 0 against g40 cannot be rejected at a p-value of 0.20. Hence, on the basis of our OLS estimates, we would conclude that the education externality is found to be too large when the empirical model is not properly restricted, and found to be absent when all control variables suggested by our empirical model are included. Taken at face value, this result would suggest that the observed level of subsidization of schooling is not justified for reasons of economic efficiency. 9 To check the validity of our preferred specification, we run several misspecification tests. The RESET test, which includes powers of the fitted variables in the regression, indicates that there might be a general specification problem, but this is a borderline case (test statistic 2.60, p-value 0.058). 9. This is not to deny that in the absence of a human capital externality there may be other reasons beyond efficiency for the public subsidization of schooling. Beginning with Rauch (1993), a related empirical literature that focuses on external effects at the level of cities also fails to provide definitive conclusions on the existence and size of human capital externalities, as surveyed by Moretti (2004) . Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) report small local human capital externalities but conjecture that larger external returns may arise if locally generated ideas are used in other parts of the country. Ciccone and Peri (2006) find no evidence of statistically significant average schooling externalities at the city level or the US state level.
Including powers of the explanatory variable b 1 qschool j þ b 2 exper j does not signal any misspecification (test statistic 0.36, p-value 0.783). The Breusch-Pagan test indicates that there is no heteroskedasticity at the 5% level no matter whether the squared residuals are regressed on the fitted values (test statistic 2.17, p-value 0.141) or on the explanatory variables (test statistic 8.23, p-value 0.083). The White test for heteroskedasticity indicates a borderline case (test statistic 15.53, p-value 0.050). Using robust standard errors we obtain virtually unchanged results, and so we conclude that heteroskedasticity is not a severe problem.
Further analysis shows that the SSA dummy is most strongly correlated with the squared residuals, which appears to reflect that the three largest outliers in our sample are observed for SSA countries. We define a country observation as an outlier if the absolute standardized regression residual is larger than 2. A regression without the outliers 10 produces an estimate for g of Notes: We assume a ¼ 1=3, b 1 ¼ 0:1 and b 2 ¼ 0:03. The capital externality parameter g is calculated as the reported regression coefficient on the combined measure of education minus ð1 À aÞ ¼ 2=3; see equation (10) 0.10 with a standard error of 0.104 and no heteroskedasticity problem. A weighted OLS estimation yields virtually the same results. Another objection against our OLS approach is that the regressors are probably measured with random fluctuations, and this may especially hold for our measure of schooling quality, which is an important variable in our analysis. We consider how the regression results change if we contaminate our measure of schooling quality with a white-noise recording error. Assuming that the quality dispersion between similar countries is overstated, we chose a recording error variance that equals half of the sample variance of the schooling quality variable for the Western European countries of our sample, 11 which are presumably not too different in terms of other socioeconomic variables. Adding this recording error to the schooling quality variable and re-estimating the preferred specification leads to an average change in the estimate for g of 0.014. Hence, our results appear to be only weakly affected by potential recording errors of schooling quality.
One further caveat of our results is that they may be biased because of endogenous regressors and especially because of measurement error. For instance, schooling and experience may be imperfect proxy variables for a true measure of educational capital, with or without an adjustment for schooling quality. To control for this potential source of downward bias, one would have to consider instrumental variable (IV) estimation. We leave a detailed discussion of IV estimation for further research.
SUMMARY
Our paper shows how the augmented Solow model can be combined with the Mincer equation to derive a simple production function specification that allows us to estimate an education externality. With this framework, we can show how the well-known private rates of return to schooling and experience relate to a macroeconomic rate of return that takes into account all external costs and benefits of educational capital accumulation. For reasonable parameter values, we can also show that a macroeconomic return that exceeds an (adjusted) private benchmark return by only a few percentage points already implies a large education externality.
These considerations reveal why previous empirical studies have not succeeded in providing a clear-cut picture. With cross-country data, even a 5 percentage point difference in macroeconomic and private rates of return to schooling may not be large enough to allow for a statistically significant estimate of the size of the education externality, and may often not even suffice to identify its sign. Our OLS regression results confirm that what may 11. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
appear as a statistically significant estimate of an education externality disappears once the underlying specification is properly restricted. It remains to be seen whether IV estimation results will provide a different result. Depreciation rate (of physical capital); assumed to be 5%. exper
APPENDIX A
A.1. Definitions and sources of variables
Average years of experience of the working-age population in 1990, calculated as indicated in Heckman and Klenow (1997) . Based on the age distribution of the population aged 5-64 years and on school enrollment rates, which can be combined to calculate the share of the population aged 5-64 years that is working (not in school). For each age group, work experience is calculated as age minus schooling attainment minus six years. Our measure is the working-population-weighted average of these experience levels. Source: Barro and Lee (2001) ; United Nations (1997); own calculations. exprop
Index of protection against expropriation, constructed by political risk services. Source: Taken from McArthur and Sachs (2001) . g Rate of technological change; assumed to be 2%. gadp
Index of government antidiversion policies; calculated as an unweighted average of five variables: law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation and government repudiation of contracts. Source: Hall and Jones (1999 
